This paper investigates an international mixed duopoly market in which a state-owned firm coexists with a foreign labour-managed firm. Both firms are allowed to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. The following timing of actions is considered.
Introduction
As is very well known, state-owned public firms exist in many countries of the world such as developing, developed and former communist economies. The earliest work on a theoretical model of a public firm must date back almost half a century to Merrill and Schneider (1966) . Over the past few decades, the theoretical contributions of mixed markets including state-owned public firms have been made by numerous economists. For instance, Nett (1991 Nett ( , 1994 , Poyago-Theotoky (1998) , and Zhang and Li (2013) conduct mixed oligopoly markets with endogenous R&D investments. Ware (1986) , Willner (1994) , Wen and Sasaki (2001) , Nishimori and Ogawa (2004) , and Lu and Poddar (2005) investigate Cournot mixed oligopoly markets where firms determine capacity levels. White (1996) , Pal and White (1998) , Poyago-Theotoky (2001) , Myles (2002) , Fjell and Heywood (2004) , and Kato and Tomaru (2007) investigate the interaction between production subsidies and privatization. Fjell and Pal (1996) and Fjell and Heywood (2002) investigate mixed oligopoly models in which public firms compete against both foreign and domestic private firms. In addition, Bös (1984) , Cremer, Marchand and Thisse (1991) , Ogawa and Kato (2006) , Bárcena-Ruiz (2007) , Barcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2007) , and Ohnishi (2015c) examine price-setting competition with homogeneous goods or differentiated goods.
There are also many other related researches (see, e.g. George and La Manna, 1996; Mujumdar and Pal, 1998; Pal, 1998; Matsumura, 2003; Chang, 2005; Matsumura and Kanda, 2005; Beladi and Chao, 2006; Chao and Yu, 2006; Lu, 2007; Lu and Poddar, 2007, 2009; Han and Ogawa, 2008; Kato, 2008; Ohnishi, 2008; Saha and Sensarma, 2008; Artz, Heywood and McGinty, 2009; Roy chowdhury, 2009; Wang, Wang and Zhao, 2009; Heywood and Ye, 2010; Ogawa and Matsumura, 2010; Wang and Lee, 2010; Pal and Saha, 2014; Cracau, 2015) . However, all these researches consider mixed oligopoly markets where profit-maximizing capitalist firms coexist with state-owned firms, and do not include labour-managed firms.
After the pioneering contribution by Ward (1958) , numerous researchers have investigated the behaviours of labour-managed firms. For instance, Cremer and Cremer (1992) investigate a two-stage game model where firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose both the capital stock and the employment level, and demonstrate that the profit-maximizing capitalist firm produces more than the labour-managed firm in a Cournot-Nash duopoly model. Lambertini and Rossini (1998) consider a two-stage quantity-competition duopoly model with capital commitment, and demonstrate that the profit-maximizing firm optimally under-invests whereas the opposite holds for the labour-managed firm. Stewart (1991) explores strategic interactions both in a labour-managed duopoly and in a mixed duopoly with labour-managed and profit-maximizing firms using excess capacity to deter entry, and shows how the organizational form of potential entrant influences the strategy of an established firm. Ireland (2003) conducts a mixed oligopoly regime with imperfect consumer information, and demonstrates that in the free-entry mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, profit-maximizing firms set higher prices than labour-managed firms. In addition, Ohnishi (2011a) examines a model in which a profit-maximizing capitalist firm and a labour-managed firm are allowed to offer lifetime employment as a strategic device, and shows that if the labour-managed firm does not offer lifetime employment, then its reaction function is upward sloping, whereas if it does, then its reaction function changes downward sloping.
There are also numerous other published papers (see, e.g. Law and Stewart, 1983; Mai and Hwang, 1989; Horowitz, 1991; Okuguchi, 1991; Stewart, 1992; Askildsen and Ireland, 1993; Ireland and Stewart, 1995; Futagami and Okamura, 1996; Lambertini, 1997 Lambertini, , 2001 Neary and Ulph, 1997; Okamura and Futagami, 1997; Cuccia and Cellini, 2009; Luo, 2013; Kalashnikov et al, 2015) . All these papers focus on mixed oligopoly markets where labour-managed firms compete against profit-maximizing capitalist firms, and do not include state-owned public firms.
Only a few studies investigate mixed oligopoly markets that consist of state-owned and labour-managed firms. For instance, Delbono and Rossini (1992) consider a Cournot mixed duopoly model with one state-owned firm and one labour-managed firm, and show that there is a unique Cournot-Nash solution in which the state-owned firm produces more than the labour-managed firm. Ohnishi (2009) investigates the behaviours of a labour-managed firm and a state-owned firm in a two-stage mixed duopoly game, and shows that if both firms are allowed to install capacity in stage one, then there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where the labour-managed firm installs capacity whereas the state-owned firm does not. Ohnishi (2011b) investigates two three-stage games where a state-owned firm and a labour-managed firm can sequentially provide lifetime employment before competing in quantities, and demonstrates that introducing lifetime employment into the three-stage model of mixed duopoly is beneficial for both firms. In addition, Ohnishi (2015a) examines a three-stage model where a state-owned firm and a labour-managed firm can sequentially offer a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment before competing in quantities, and shows that there is an equilibrium that coincides with the Cournot solution with no wage-rise contract commitment.
We examine international mixed duopoly competition in which a state-owned firm and a foreign labour-managed firm are allowed to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment.
1 We consider the following situation. In stage 1, both firms decide independently and simultaneously whether to offer lifetime employment. If a firm offers lifetime employment, then it chooses an output level and enters into a lifetime employment contract with the number of workers necessary to achieve the output level. In stage 2, both firms independently and simultaneously choose their actual outputs.
The main purpose of this study is to trace the firms' reaction functions in the international mixed duopoly model with lifetime employment.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, the basic model of the paper is described. The third section presents the results of this study. The last section concludes the paper.
The basic setting
Let us consider a mixed duopoly economy consisting of one domestic state-owned firm (firm S) and one foreign labour-managed firm (firm L). In the remainder of this paper, subscripts S and L denote firm S and firm L, respectively. In addition, when i and j are used to refer to firms in an expression, they should be understood to refer to S and L with i j . The market price is determined by the inverse demand function ( ) P Q , where S L Qdenotes the aggregate quantity. We assume that ' 0 P and " 0 P .
The market will be modelled by means of following two-stage game. 
where r denotes the capacity (capital) cost function, w is the labour cost function, and 0 f is the fixed cost. Let " L Pq f " be the sum of firm L's variable cost and profit.
where l represents the labour input function. We assume that ' 0 l and " 0 l . This assumption means that the marginal labour input is increasing. We assume that both firms have the same technology. In addition, we assume that ' 0 r , " 0 r , ' 0 w , and " 0 w . 2 Throughout this paper, we adopt subgame perfection as our solution concept.
Reaction functions
First, we derive firm S's best response from (1). If firm S's marginal cost of production 2 We assume that both firms share the same cost function and the marginal cost is increasing. This assumption is often used in literature studying mixed markets. See, for instance, Harris and Wiens (1980) , Ware (1986) , De Fraja and Delbono (1989), Delbono and Rossini (1992), Delbono and Scarpa (1995) , Fjell and Pal (1996) , White (1996) 
We now prove the following proposition: 
and the second-order condition is L ' " " " 0 P r w P q
On the other hand, if firm S's marginal cost of production is ' r , then the first-order condition for welfare maximization is
and the second-order condition is Proposition 2 means that firm S's welfare-maximizing output is higher when its marginal cost of production is ' r than when its marginal cost of production is ' ' r w .
Third, we derive firm L's best response from (2). If firm L does not offer lifetime
On the other hand, if firm L offers lifetime employment and produces
Hence, if firm L offers lifetime employment, then its best response is representrd as follows:
We now state the following proposition:
Proof: See Ohnishi (2011a, pp. 154-155) .
For the remainder of this section, we illustrate both firms' reaction curves by using 
Conclusion
We have studied mixed duopoly competition in which a state-owned firm and a foreign labour-managed firm are allowed to offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment.
Our results can be summarized as follows. 
